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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                         
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge.     
      Preston Hampton and Carl Bowles appeal from the district 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of all defendants on 
all claims that plaintiffs brought against the Borough of Tinton 
Falls New Jersey, the Tinton Falls Police Department and numerous 
governing officials of that borough.  Hampton, who is Black, is a 
Detective Sergeant with the Tinton Falls Police Department; 
Bowles, who is also Black, is a former Borough employee and a 
named plaintiff by virtue of his status as a resident in the 
borough.  Plaintiffs allege illegal discrimination in connection 
with the borough's decision not to promote Hampton from sergeant 
to lieutenant.  We hold that the district court properly granted 
summary judgment on plaintiff's "disparate-impact" claim, but 
that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on 
plaintiffs' other claims.  Accordingly, we will affirm in part, 
and reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings. 
 
                                I. 
     In October of 1994, the Tinton Falls Police Department 
announced two openings for promotion to the rank of lieutenant.  
Hampton was one of four candidates to apply for the positions, 
and was the only Black candidate.  The three other candidates 
were Sergeant Peterson and Sergeant Turning, both of whom are 
White, and Sergeant Gonzalez, who is Latino.  In order to be 
promoted, a candidate had to first pass a multiple choice exam, 
then compete before a Promotional Review Board ("PRB"), and an 
Oral Review Board ("ORB").  Although the actual score of the 
"objective" multiple choice exam was not factored into the 
process, an applicant could not be promoted without receiving a 
passing grade on that exam.  The Review Board evaluations were 
subjective.   
     The multiple choice exam was administered in January of 1995 
by Iowa Testing Service.  All four of the candidates passed the 
test and were then reviewed by the PRB and ORB.   Initially, the 
PRB was comprised of Borough Administrator and Public Safety 
Director Anthony Muscillo, Major Melvin McKeller, Borough 
Prosecutor Pat Menna and Borough Council member Gabe Tornillo. 
McKeller, who is Black, subsequently announced his retirement and 
declined to serve on the Promotional Review Board,  and Captain 
(now Major) LaDean White was appointed to replace McKeller.  App. 
at 703-04.  Captain White was the immediate supervisor for 
candidates Turning, Gonzalez and Peterson.  Sergeant Hampton was  
part of the Detectives Bureau and reported to Captain Robert 
Jantausch. After White replaced McKellar, neither the PRB nor the 
ORB had any minority members.  App. at 704. 
     The PRB met in February of 1995 to review the candidates.  
The Board evaluated the applicants' records and performance using 
ten factors, each of which was worth ten percent of a candidate's 
evaluation.  The categories for evaluation included: 
     (1)  leadership ability 
     (2)  communication skills 
     (3)  decision making ability 
     (4)  working with others 
     (5)  personal commitment 
     (6)  problem analysis               
     (7)  adherence to rules  
     (8)  education and self-improvement 
     (9)  length and merit of service 
     (10) overall fitness for the position 
     Each Board member had access to the candidate's resume, 
performance evaluations for the three prior evaluation periods, 
and the candidate's personnel file.  The Board members reviewed 
those records and also discussed their impressions of the 
candidates based upon personal experiences.  The PRB gave Turning 
a score of 93.875, Gonzalez a score of 90.5, Peterson a score of  
77.875, and Hampton a score of 77.625. 
     The candidates also met with the ORB which consisted of 
Anthony Muscillo, Joseph Torchia and Louis Napolitano.  Muscillo, 
as stated above, is the Borough Administrator.  Torchia and 
Napolitano are both Public Safety Directors from neighboring 
municipalities.  The ORB evaluated each of the candidates' 
responses to the same series of questions involving everyday 
police activities.  The candidates were judged on their decision- 
making ability, analytical ability, communication skills, 
judgment and creativity.  Turning received the highest score from 
each of the Board members, and the highest average score of 
94.83.  Gonzalez received the second highest score from each of 
the Board members and had the second highest overall score of 
87.93.  Peterson had an average score of 82.16 and Hampton had an 
average score of 76.10. 
     The scores from the PRB and the ORB were then averaged with 
each score weighted equally.  Turning and Gonzalez were promoted 
to the rank of lieutenant, and Hampton filed a complaint with the 
EEOC claiming that he was not promoted because of his race.  The 
complaint was filed at the EEOC office in Newark on April 12, 
1995, but it was erroneously dated April 13, 1995.  This error 
caused problems because when the Borough's Personnel 
Administrator (Helen Auringer) saw the incorrect EEOC filing 
date, she noted that Hampton had been on duty all day on April 
13, 1995, and should not have been in Newark visiting the EEOC. 
As a result, an internal investigation was initiated and on May 
2, 1995, Hampton was notified that he was under disciplinary 
investigation for "[g]oing to Newark on duty time to file a 
complaint with [the] EEOC" and "[u]sing a department vehicle to 
travel to Newark for personal business without authorization."  
App. at 281.  The Borough maintains that it soon discovered the 
typographical error and ended the investigation without any 
adverse consequences to Hampton.  However, it is alleged that on 
August 28, 1995, without any explanation, Major White told 
Hampton that he (Hampton) was being removed from the detective 
bureau and reassigned to road patrol. Brief for Appellants at 12.  
Hampton claims that he continues on road patrol even though White 
told him that the reassignment would be temporary.  Id. 
                                II . 
     Hampton asserts several theories of recovery.  Counts One to 
Five allege that defendants' actions in not promoting him 
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New 
Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1, and 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.  Count Six is an "Action in Lieu of 
Prerogative Writ" alleging that defendants were arbitrary, 
capricious and unreasonable in violation of N.J.S.A. § 40A:14- 
129.  Count Seven alleges a breach of contract claim based upon 
the Police Department's alleged failure to comply with the 
Borough's affirmative action policy that we need not discuss.  
Counts Eight to Ten allege that Hampton's reassignment was in 
retaliation for his EEOC complaint in violation of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination, N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1, and Hampton's free speech 
rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.   
     Defendants moved for summary judgment as to the entire 
complaint, arguing that plaintiffs failed to set forth a genuine 
issue of material fact that would establish racial discrimination 
or allow an inference of racial animus.  In response, plaintiffs 
argued that racial pretext or direct discrimination was apparent 
from the evidence and that therefore, summary judgment in favor 
of the defendants would be inappropriate.  Additionally, 
plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment as to Count 
Six of their complaint, arguing that the defendants violated 
N.J.S.A. § 40A:14-129 by failing to give due consideration to the 
length and merit of service criterion in the promotion process. 
     The district court granted summary judgment for the 
defendants as to all counts of plaintiffs' complaint, and this 
appeal followed. 
                               III. 
     The district court's grant of summary judgment is a final 
order that disposed of all claims, and this court therefore has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our 
review of the district court's summary judgment order is plenary, 
and we apply the same test as the district court.  Sempier v. 
Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 727 (1995); Chipollini v. Spencer 
Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 896 (3d Cir.) (in banc), cert. 
dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987).  Summary judgment is appropriate 
when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
and there is no genuine dispute of material fact.  Gottshall v. 
Consolidated Rail Corp., 56 F.3d 530, 533 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).  In order to defeat "a properly supported 
summary judgment motion, the party opposing it must present 
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find in its favor."  
Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-52 
(1986)).  In essence, the non-moving party must demonstrate a 
dispute over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit.  
Id.  Moreover, in reviewing the record, we must give the non- 
moving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences.  Josey v. 
John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 637 (3d Cir. 1993).   
 
                               IV. 
     Plaintiffs' discrimination claims are based upon both 
disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of 
discrimination.   
 
               "`Disparate treatment' . . . is the most 
          easily understood type of discrimination.  
          The employer simply treats some people less 
          favorably than others because of their race, 
          color, religion [or other protected 
          characteristics.]  Proof of discriminatory 
          motive is critical, although it can in some 
          situations be inferred from the mere fact of 
          differences in treatment. . . . 
 
               "[C]laims that stress `disparate impact' 
          [by contrast] involve employment practices 
          that are facially neutral in their treatment 
          of different groups but that in fact fall 
          more harshly on one group than another and 
          cannot be justified by business necessity.  
          Proof of discriminatory motive . . . is not 
          required under a disparate treatment theory."  
          Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 355 
          n.15 (1977) (citation omitted). 
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,    U.S.   , 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1705-06, 
123 L. Ed. 2d 338, 346 (1993).  The district court adequately 
explained why plaintiffs' disparate impact theory could not 
survive defendant's motion for summary judgment, and we affirm 
that part of the district court's decision for the reasons set 
forth by the district court. See Dist. Ct. Op., App. at 15-17.  
      
                                A. 
     Disparate Treatment Claim 
     Plaintiffs' disparate treatment claim is based upon 
"pretext."  Brief for Appellants at 14-15.   As this court 
explained in Waldron v. SL Industries, Inc., 56 F.3d 491 (3d Cir. 
1995), the burden-shifting analysis established in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and more recently 
refined in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,    U.S.   , 113 S. 
Ct. 2742 125 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1993), is the appropriate analysis 
for summary judgment motions in cases alleging violations of 
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination.  Waldron, 56 F.3d at 494, 504.   
          Under the familiar shifting burdens analysis 
          of McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must 
          initially establish a minimal prima facie 
          case -- essentially, that he or she is a 
          member of a protected class and was qualified 
          for an employment position, but that he or 
          she was either not hired for that position or 
          was fired from it "under circumstances that 
          give rise to an inference of unlawful 
          discrimination."  Texas Dept. of Community 
          Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).  
          Once the plaintiff establishes his or her 
          prima facie case, the burden shifts to the 
          defendant to articulate one or more 
          legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for 
          its employment decision.  If one or more such 
          reasons are proffered, the presumption of 
          discrimination created by establishment of 
          the prima facie case is dispelled, and the 
          plaintiff must prove that the employer's 
          proffered reason or reasons were pretextual - 
          - that is, that they are false and that the 
          real reason for the employment decision was 
          discriminatory. 
Id. at 494 (footnote omitted).  However, we also noted that: 
          [b]ecause the factfinder may infer from the 
          combination of the plaintiff's prima facie 
          case and its own rejection of the employer's 
          proffered non-discriminatory reasons that the 
          employer unlawfully discriminated against the 
          plaintiff and was merely trying to conceal 
          its illegal act with articulated reasons, seeHicks,    U.S. at 
the 113 S. Ct. at 2749, a 
          plaintiff who has made out a prima facie case 
          may defeat a motion for summary judgment by 
          either (i) discrediting the proffered 
          reasons, either circumstantially or directly, 
          or (ii) adducing evidence, whether 
          circumstantial or direct, that discrimination 
          was more likely than not a motivating or 
          determinative cause of the adverse employment 
          action. 
Id. at 495 (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 
1994)).  
     Here, the district court and the defendants assumed that a 
prima facie case had been established for purposes of ruling upon 
the defendants' summary judgment motion.  App. at 19.  Thus, the 
burden shifted to the defendants to proffer a legitimate, non- 
discriminatory reason for failing to promote Hampton.  Defendants  
met that burden by attempting to demonstrate that each of the 
candidates was evaluated by the same criteria, and that Turning 
and Gonzalez were promoted because they had received the highest 
score in the PRB and ORB evaluations, and were therefore the most 
qualified.  Id. at 19-20.  The district court accepted 
defendants' explanations, and further concluded that Hampton did 
not satisfy his burden of either demonstrating that defendants' 
proffered reasons were pretextual or presenting other evidence 
from which a factfinder could reasonably conclude that 
discrimination factored into the decision to promote Turning and 
Gonzalez instead of him.  Id. at 12.  We disagree. 
     The district court either ignored several discrepancies in 
the evaluation process, or failed to give all reasonable 
inferences arising there from the plaintiffs as it was required 
to do in ruling upon a motion for summary judgment.  These 
discrepancies and inferences could support (though they certainly 
do not compel) a jury finding that race was a motivating factor 
in the decision not to promote Hampton.  When Hampton's 
performance evaluations were considered by the PRB, less (if any) 
consideration was given to the recommendation that Major McKeller 
gave him.  Yet, McKeller was Hampton's supervisor at the time of 
the promotion review.  Major White explained the decision to 
minimize the importance of McKellar's evaluation as follows:  
          A:   It may have been discussed. I don't know 
               if it was considered only because of the 
               evaluator. 
 
          Q:   And "only because of the evaluator," 
               what do you mean by that? 
 
          A:   Mel McKeller evaluated him at that time. 
 
          Q:   Why would that be a concern? 
 
          A:   Because he was in charge of the 
               detective bureau at that time and 
               presently was at that time of the 
               promotional procedure the commanding 
               officer of the department and he's also 
               black. 
 
          Q:   Why would him being black have any type 
               of effect on whether you would consider 
               this particular performance evaluation? 
 
          AA:  If there was any doubt of whether or not 
               the evaluations previous were being 
               considered to be inaccurate.  It shows 
               continuity. 
App. at 245 (emphasis).   
     Major White further explained that McKeller's evaluations 
may not have been considered because the evaluators knew that 
McKeller was "pushing Preston Hampton for a promotion at that 
time."  App. at 245. Defendants argue that the evaluators 
reasonably assumed that McKeller's evaluation was improper 
because McKeller wanted Hampton to be promoted.  In reviewing 
this testimony the district court explained: 
          Hampton had been evaluated by Jantausch, who 
          was not on the committee.  Consideration of 
          McKeller's evaluation, therefore, allowed the 
          board to determine whether Jantaush's 
          evaluations of Hampton, which were average, 
          were consistent with Hampton's performance.  
          The board concluded that McKeller's 
          evaluation and Jantausch's evaluation were 
          consistent with each other. 
               I find this explanation reasonable. 
 
Dist Ct. Op. at 15-6 (underlining added). 
     The district court, therefore, found the proffered 
explanation both credible and "reasonable."  In doing so, it 
clearly usurped the role of the jury.  It does not appear that 
the race of any other evaluator was a source of concern for 
anyone involved in deciding who was to be promoted.  It was for a 
jury, not a judge, to determine if White's neutral explanation of 
the concern for McKellar's race was credible and reasonable.  
Incredibly, (and perhaps disingenuously) defendants now argue 
that Major White's testimony would not provide evidence from 
which a jury could infer racial animus.  We disagree. 
     Defendants maintain that they were not required to consider 
McKeller's evaluations in any event because police promotional 
procedure only requires the PRB to consider each candidate's 
"last three performance evaluations," app. at 284, and McKeller's 
evaluation was outside of that range. However, the police 
promotional procedure also states that the PRB would consider 
each candidate's evaluation "for the last three years."  Id.  For 
those candidates who were only evaluated annually, the two 
standards result in consideration of the same number of 
evaluations -- three.  However, for candidates such as Hampton, 
who were evaluated bi-annually, these two policies conflict.  An 
employee who is evaluated annually would have three evaluations 
under either policy, but Hampton would have six evaluations.  
McKeller's evaluation, though not one of Hampton's prior three 
evaluations, was an evaluation that had been completed within the 
prior three years.  It was for a fact finder to determine what, 
if any, significance the Board's decision to look only to 
Hampton's last three evaluations had. A jury could conclude that 
the Board did so pursuant to its policy of looking to the last 
three evaluations, or it could conclude that the totality of the 
circumstances here suggest that racial considerations motivated 
the Board to ignore whatever evaluation McKellar gave knowing 
that the conflict in personnel policy would explain its actions.  
     Plaintiffs also argue that Hampton's scores in the category 
of "Education and Self-Improvement" reflect a discrepancy that 
could give rise to a jury inference of discrimination.  In this 
category, Gabe Tornillo gave Hampton a score of "5," app. at 346, 
even though Hampton has an associates degree and credits from a 
state college.  App. at 371.  By contrast, Tornillo gave Gonzalez 
a "10" in this category, app. at 344, although he had yet to 
complete the requirements for the degree he was pursuing. App. at 
379.  Defendants justify this by asserting that the scoring 
discrepancy merely reflects that Gonzalez was working toward his 
degree, and thus demonstrating a desire for self-improvement 
while he was on the police force. Hampton, defendants argue, had 
already completed his degree prior to becoming a police officer, 
and did not take additional courses during his tenure with the 
police department.   
     Similarly, Tornillo gave Hampton (who had 18 years of 
service on the police force and no demerits in his personnel 
file) a "6" in the category "Length and Merit of Service."  
However, other candidates with less time received ratings between 
"8" and "10" in this category.  App. at 343-46.  The district 
court correctly ruled that under N.J.S.A. § 40A:14-129 length of 
service alone would not guarantee Hampton the promotion.  SeeGaskill v. 
Mayor and Comm'rs of Avalon, 373 A.2d 1019, 1020 (N.J. 
Super. 1977) ("In our opinion this statutory preference to those 
who enjoy seniority in service is applicable where two or more 
candidates have approximately equal qualifications.  It is but an 
additional factor to be considered on the merits of the 
evaluation of the individuals for promotion and not a mechanical 
rule which guarantees promotion to the senior employee."). 
     The significance of such evidence is for a jury's 
determination, not a court's. Had these discrepancies been 
presented to a jury, it may have found defendants' explanations 
quite credible, and returned a verdict in their favor.  However, 
that is not the test that we employ, nor is it the test the 
district court should have employed. Drawing all reasonable 
inferences in favor of plaintiffs, as we must, it is clear that 
they were entitled to have a jury decide whether or not the 
reasons proffered for not promoting Hampton were real or 
pretextual.    
     Defendants also urge us to affirm the district court 
because, according to Turning's affidavit, when Hampton told his 
colleagues he was going to file suit he stated that "he did not 
think that there was a racial motive to the Borough's actions, 
but rather he was using this method to get in the door."  Supp. 
App. at 6.  Plaintiffs counter that, assuming Hampton made such a 
statement, it was made to the successful applicant before Hampton 
became aware of evidence of discrimination. They claim that, once 
he became aware of this information, consulted with his attorney 
and actually filed suit, there could have been a number of 
reasons motivating Hampton's decision to sue, including a desire 
to gain access to his test scores and a belief that a discrepancy 
in certain scores was motivated by racial bias.  Further, during 
his deposition when Hampton was asked whether he thought certain 
low scores he received from the interviewees were racially 
motivated, he responded that he did not know what the motivations 
for the scores were or what bases were used to determine those 
scores.  App. at 198.   
     We decline to preclude Hampton from proceeding with this 
suit based upon a statement alleged to have been made before 
Hampton actually filed suit. At trial, a jury may conclude that 
these remarks present an insurmountable obstacle to plaintiff's 
recovery, but that is neither for us, nor the district court to 
determine at this time.  
     The district court stated that it found "at best, complaints 
of errors or omissions on the part of the board."  Dist Ct. Op. 
at 24.  However, the district court erred in not recognizing that 
the reasonable inferences that arise from these "errors and 
omissions" can create a jury question.  The errors and omissions 
can not be dismissed as immaterial as a matter of law.  Thus, we 
must reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment on 
plaintiff's "pretext" claim.  
     B.  Retaliation Claim 
     Hampton alleges that his rights were violated when 
defendants retaliated against him by initiating an internal 
affairs investigation to determine whether or not he traveled to 
Newark to file an EEOC complaint while he was on duty, and 
subsequently, by removing him from the detective bureau and 
reassigning him to road patrol without explanation.  Hampton 
claims that this conduct was retaliation in violation of Title 
VII, the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, and his free 
speech rights. 
     The district court accepted defendants' assertion that the 
investigation arose out of a typographical error in plaintiffs' 
Verified Complaint.  Defendants do not deny that when Borough 
Administrator, Helen Auringer, read the Verified Complaint 
without knowing the date was incorrect, Hampton was investigated.  
However, defendants maintain that when it became apparent that 
plaintiffs' complaint contained a typographical error, the 
investigation was closed.  The district court thus concluded that 
no adverse action had been taken against Hampton as a result of 
the EEOC complaint, and that he therefore failed to establish a 
prima facie case of retaliation. 
     However, the district court did not go far enough. Although 
the investigation was dropped, Hampton's involuntary transfer 
remained.  App. at 91.  Hampton maintains that on August 28, 
1995, he was suddenly told by Major White that he was being 
removed from the detective bureau and reassigned to road patrol. 
Hampton deems this to be a demotion.  No explanation for the 
transfer was given, and although the transfer was to have been 
"temporary," the record reflects that it remains in effect. 
Hampton further claims that when he inquired about the reason for 
his transfer, Major White told him; "[d]on't worry, if you win 
this suit, nothing is going to happen anyway."  Brief for 
Appellants at 12.   
     Defendants argue that Hampton's transfer was merely a 
reassignment and not a demotion, as neither Hampton's rank, nor 
his pay have been decreased.  Defendants' further argue that the 
reassignment was part of a routine rotation schedule that 
requires officers to rotate from one department to another every 
three to five years.  Although the rotation may not be a 
demotion, it came on the heels of his EEOC filing, and plaintiffs 
argue that the road patrol assignment is less desirable than that 
of detective bureau.  Moreover, Hampton remains in his new 
assignment even though it was supposed to have been temporary.  
The significance of these facts should be resolved by jury 
deliberations, not motions for summary judgment.  Accordingly, we 
will reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment on 
plaintiff's claim of retaliation. 
                     C.N.J.S.A. § 40a:14-129 
     As noted above, Count Seven of the Complaint alleges that 
defendants violated N.J.S.A. § 40a:14-129 by failing to give 
adequate consideration to his length and merit of service.  As 
the district court properly noted, that statute does not require 
that a promotion be governed solely by seniority.  Dist. Ct. Op. 
at 18.  (citing Gaskill v. Mayor & Comm'rs of Avalon, 149 N.J.S. 
364 (App. Div. 1977).  Nevertheless, we are not prepared to hold, 
as a matter of law, that a jury could not conclude that this 
statute was not violated even if it concludes that Hampton's race 
was a factor in the defendants' failure to promote him.  Although 
we agree that it appears unlikely plaintiffs can prevail on this 
claim, if they can prove that, but for Hampton's race, his 
greater seniority would have earned him the promotion he sought, 
he may be able to establish a violation of the statute. Thus, we 
will reverse the district court's entry of summary judgment as to 
Count Seven of the Complaint as well. 
 
                         IV.  CONCLUSION 
     For the reasons stated in the foregoing, we will vacate the 
order of the district court dated October 18, 1995, and remand 
the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
